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Abstract 
We present a framework for reasoning about processes (complex actions) that are constituted by 
several concurrent activities performed by various interacting agents. The framework is based on 
two distinct formalisms: a representation formalism, which is a CCS-like process algebra associated 
with an explicit global store; and a reasoning formalism, which is an extension of modal mu- 
calculus, a powerful logic of programs that subsumes dynamic logics such as PDL and APDL, and 
branching temporal logics such as CTL and CTL*. The reasoning service of interest in this setting is 
model checking in contrast to logical implication. This framework, although directly applicable only 
when complete information on the system behavior is available, has several interesting features for 
reasoning about actions in Artificial Intelligence. Indeed, it inherits formal and practical tools from 
the area of Concurrency in Computer Science, to deal with complex actions, treating suitably aspects 
like nonterminating executions, parallelism, communications, and interruptions. 0 1999 Published 
by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
Keywords: Process algebra; Modal mu-calculus; Reasoning about actions; Concurrency; Model checking; 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we present a piece of research that can be regarded as a bridge between 
the area of Reasoning about Actions in Artificial Intelligence and the area of Concurrency 
in Computer Science. 
* A shorter version of this paper appeared in the Proceeding of the Thirteenth National Conference on Artificial 
Intelligence (AAAI-96). 
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On the one hand, we follow a methodology that is typical of Reasoning about Actions 
in Artificial Intelligence for specifying and reasoning about dynamic systems (e.g., see the 
situation calculus in [49]): introducing a set of facts whose value changes as the system 
evolves (cf. &YZ~.F in [49]); specifying e#ect.s of (atomic) actions on such a set of facts 
(cf. effect axioms in [49]); devising a suitable means to obtain the successor-state resulting 
from executing an action in the current state (cf. successor-state axioms in [49]). We also 
introduce a specification of preconditions for executing actions (cf. precondition axioms in 
[49]). However, we allow such a specification to change during the evolution of the system 
(differently from precondition axioms in [49]). In addition to this general picture, we allow 
for multiple atomic actions to occur together (for reasons that will become clear later 
on. we call the resulting actions synchmni~ed actions instead of concurrent (elementary) 
actions as, e.g., in [2.5,24,42,50]), and we allow for organizing actions within suitable 
control structures (sequential composition, parallel composition, iteration, recursion, etc.) 
by introducing an explicit notion of process in describing the system. 
On the other hand, we make use of modeling tools that have been developed in the area 
of Concurrency in Computer Science to formalize concurrent processes, instead of the ones 
typically used in Reasoning about Action in Artificial Intelligence (i.e., logics). However, 
in order to make use of such tools, we need to describe the dynamic system on a more 
concrete level of abstraction than the one typically adopted in Reasoning about Actions. 
In general, we may choose among several levels of abstraction when describing a 
dynamic system, depending on the information we assume available. We distinguish the 
following three levels: 
(1) At a very concrete level, we may characterize the system by its unique actual 
evolution, which can be represented as a sequence of states/actions. At this level, 
we assume complete information on each state, and we assume knowledge of which 
action will be performed next. 
(2) At a more abstract level, we may characterize the system by all its possible 
evolutions. In this case, the system is represented as a transition graph, called 
transition system, instead of a single sequence. The single evolution at level 1 
is represented as a p&h on such a graph. One of these paths is going to be the 
actual evolution of the system, yet we do not have the knowledge on which one 
it is. Each node (representing a state) has several labeled out-arcs which represent 
the actions that can be performed in that state. Each action causes the transition 
of the system from the current state to a possible successor-state. We remark that 
different out-arcs may be labeled by the same action. In this case, the action 
has several alternative outcomes: the action is nondeterministic. At this level, we 
assume complete information on the possible evolutions of the system: each state 
is completely known. including which actions enabled to be performed, and each 
action leads to some completely known state. However, we do not know which 
action is going to be performed next. Moreover, for nondeterministic actions, it is 
not known which of the alternative resulting states is going to be the next one. 
(3) At the third level, we model the system by selecting a set of transition systems 
instead of a unique one. Each of such transition systems represents an alternative 
possible behavior. At this level, we assume partial information on the possible 
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evolutions of the system: each state is only partially known, and so are the states 
resulting from performing an action in it. 
Generally, level 1 is considered too concrete: it is unrealistic to obtain such complete 
information in order to single out a unique system run. 2 Levels 2 and 3 instead, have been 
both used in modeling dynamic systems. 
In particular, level 3 is the one usually adopted by research in reasoning about actions 
[24,37,38,41,42,49,51], where a certain logic (situation calculus, dynamic logic, etc.) is 
used both to represent and to reason about the dynamic systems. The typical reasoning 
problem of interest in this case is logic& implication (validity) in the form 
where l-’ are axioms used to select the set of transition systems that represent he dynamic 
system; Sinit is a formula, which is a (partial) description of the initial state; @ is a formula, 
which is the property we want to prove, e.g., the reachability of a state where a certain 
property (the goal) holds. 
In this paper, we adopt the viewpoint of level 2. Following the model checking 
approach proposed in [27], we use a representation formalism to define the transition 
system representing the possible evolutions of the system, and a reasoning formalism 
(a suitable logic) for specifying properties we want to check. This framework is the 
one typically used in process algebras (e.g., CCS [45], CSP [30], ACP [3]) to model 
concurrent and reactive systems. 3 Process algebras are generally recognized as a 
convenient tool for describing concurrent and multiprocess systems. They provide us with a 
clean way to express parallelism, reactivity, communications, interruptions, coordinations, 
synchronizations/asynchronizations, etc. Moreover, for finite state processes (processes 
that can be interpreted on finite transition systems), various practical tools have been 
developed and implemented to verify whether a given modal/temporal logic formula is 
satisfied by the process (e.g., [6,10,11,44]). 
The reasoning problem of interest in this case is model checking in the form 
where 7 is a transition system representing the possible evolutions of our dynamic system; 
sinit is the initial state of 7; Q, is a formula, which is the property we want to prove, e.g., 
the reachability of a state where a certain property (the goal) holds. 
In our work, the state of the system called conjigurution, is composed of an active 
component called process and a passive component called global store. The process 
describes the activities of all the agents (e.g., robots, persons, pieces of software, 
subroutines, environment, etc.) in the system. The global store, which is characterized by 
a set of primitive propositions, describes the state of the world except for the activities that 
are going on. The configuration can only be changed by the activities in the process, which 
in fact make the system evolve. 
2 However, one can describe a dynamic system by specifying its properties using Linear-time Temporal Logics 
that are interpreted over system runs (see, e.g., [18]). 
3 In Artificial Intelligence, research in search-based planning, including much work on STRIPS (e.g., [8]) can 
be considered at this level. In contrast, research in deductive planning is typically carried out at level 3. 
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Making use of a global store associated to a process, we specify the effects of an 
action in terms of the difference between the current global store and the resulting one. 
Properties not mentioned among such effects are kept unchanged. 4 Note that this treatment 
is different from most of the approaches in the literature on logics of programs [34], where 
all properties of the state resulting from an action must be specified explicitly. 
In order to reason about the properties of such modeled dynamic systems, we develop 
a suitable extension of modal mu-calculus [32], a powerful logic of programs which 
subsumes dynamic logics such as PDL, APDL [34], and temporal logics such as CTL, 
CTL” [ 181. We show that model checking in our logic can be linearly reduced to model 
checking in standard modal mu-calculus. By means of this reduction, it is possible to reuse 
efficiently the existing verification tools mentioned above, for reasoning about actions in 
our setting. 
We also discuss two important additional issues: (1) the relationship between model 
checking and logical implication in our setting; (2) how to identify two representations of 
a dynamic system. For the former, we device a suitable notion of characteristic jkwmulu 
[53], which is a logical formula that completely characterizes a transition system. For the 
latter, we introduce a suitable notion of equivalence based on bisimulation [45]. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our representation 
formalism in detail. In Section 3, we discuss the main feature of the representation 
formalism by illustrating several examples. In Section 4, we present the reasoning 
formalism and show its ability to express a wide variety of dynamic properties. In 
Section 5, we show by means of examples, the use of the reasoning formalism for reasoning 
about actions in the proposed framework. In Section 6, we devise a suitable reasoning 
technique for model checking in our setting, by reducing it to a standard setting. In 
Section 7, we discuss the relationship between model checking and logical implication, and 
the issue of equivalent descriptions. In Section 8, we draw some conclusions and sketch 
some possible future research directions. 
2. Representation formalism: A process algebra with global store 
We represent dynamic systems in terms of possible evolutions of the system caused by 
actions. We call conj?gurution the state of the system at a point of its possible evolutions. 
A configuration is represented as a pair: 
where p is called process and o is called global store. Intuitively, the process describes 
all the activities that are being performed by the agents in the system-or to be precise, 
the status of such activities in the current configuration. The global store describes the 
properties characterizing the current configuration that do not involve activities being 
performed. As the activities in the process are performed, both the global store and the 
process evolve, and hence the configuration of the system changes. 
’ In this way we address the simplified variant of the frame problem that arises in our setting. 
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We formalize possible global stores simply as propositional interpretations. Let Prop be 
a finite set of propositions of propositional logic (ranged over by A, B, . . . , possibly with 
a subscript). A global store u is a propositional interpretation over Prop. Given a global 
store o and a proposition A E Prop, a(A) = tt if the fact denoted by A is true in o and 
cr (A) =ff if the fact denoted by A is false in o . 
Before formalizing processes, we need to introduce elementary actions. Indeed, a 
process carries the information on “which elementary actions are possible next”, and for 
each of such actions, “what is the process left to be petiormed afterwards”. 
We consider two kinds of elementary actions: 
- Atomic actions which are basic uninterruptible actions executed by an agent. We 
assume the set of all possible atomic actions to be finite. 
- Synchronized actions which are constituted by any nonempty set of atomic actions 
performed together by various agents. Intuitively, to execute a synchronized action 
means to execute a set of atomic actions simultaneously as a unity. That is, the 
execution of each atomic action in a synchronized action, implicitly relies on the 
feedback of the executions of the others. 
Each action has some effects on the global store. The specification of such effects is 
supplied separately from the process by defining an effect function. The effect function 
specifies the effects of each atomic action with respect to different conditions on the global 
store. On the base of such an effect function, a successor-state function is defined which, 
given a global store and an atomic or synchronized action, returns the set 5 of possible next 
global stores. 6 
Besides effects, each action has typically some associated preconditions, i.e., conditions 
under which an action can be performed. In our setting, action preconditions are specified 
within the process. This treatment provides us with the capability of describing action 
preconditions which depend not only on the status of the global store but also on the 
status of the process. So a process can, for instance, dynamically block the possibility 
of executing an action in some configurations when certain activities are being performed. 
2. I. Atomic actions 
Let Act be the finite set of all possible atomic actions (ranged over by a, b, . . . , possibly 
with a subscript). 
We define an effect function effct that associates to each action a E Act, a finite set of 
pairs of premise and effect: 
e@fW = { (1cI1, El), . . . , (1cr,, En)] 
where for each pair (@i , Ei): 
- The premise I+$ is a propositional formula over Prop describing the properties the 
global store must satisfy so that the corresponding effect Ei can be applied. 
5 Recall that actions are generally nondeterministic, so we have a set of (rather than a single) possible next 
global stores. 
6 Such an approach for specifying effects is quite similar to that of the A-family action languages [23,39]. 
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- The effect Ei is a set of literals-atomic propositions or their negations-over Prop 
that describes a possible effect of the execution of action a under premise $i. The 
literals in Ei are required to be true in the successive global store. 
Each pair (+i, E;) in @et(a). can be intuitively interpreted as an assertion that if the 
premise $r; is true in the current global store, then there is a possible execution of a that 
causes the literals in Ei to be true in the resulting global store. In other words, the action a 
under the premise @i has E, as possible effect. 
Next, we introduce a simple update operator o that, given an interpretation (T and a set 
of non-contradictory literals G, returns a new interpretation 0’. 
Definition 2.1. Let rr be an interpretation over Prop and L a set of non-contradictory 
literals over Prop. We detine the update operator o (infix) as follows: VA E Prop, 
I tt A EC. (a o L)(A) = fl -AEC, 
I a(A) AgLand-A$C. 
Intuitively, the operator returns an interpretation that satisfies the literals in L, and retains 
the value of the original interpretation o for those literals not occurring in C. 
Making use of the above update operator, we define a successor-state function that 
specifies how an atomic action affects the global store. 
Definition 2.2. Let a be an atomic action, and c a global store (i.e., an interpretation over 
Prop). The set of possible global stores obtained by executing u in 0, denoted by ala, is 
the set of all interpretations: 
COL: 
such that 
-c= 
1 
E if 3$ s.t. (+. E) E &,t(a) and a($) = tt. 
ti otherwise. 
- C does not contain contradictory literals. 
Intuitively, the set D/U of alternative global stores resulting from executing action a on 
r~ is formed by one alternative updated global store for each effect E of a whose premise 
+ is satisfied in u. For each E, the resulting global store is equal to cr o E, that is, it is 
identical to cr except that the values of the atomic propositions occurring in E are changed 
so as to make E true. 
Observe that action a is nondeterministic (with respect o the effects on the global store) 
in a-i.e., a/u is not singleton-if more then one premise in @@t(a) is satisfied. It is 
deterministic (with respect to the effects on the global store)-i.e., a/a is singleton ’ -if 
just one premise is satisfied. 
’ Note that even if a/u is singleton, there may still he more than one rewlting configurations since the current 
pmcrss may evolve in several possible ways by performing (1. 
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By definition, if no premise in e@%(a) is satisfied then a/a = 6, i.e., the action has no 
effect (though it may still be performed). 
Finally, if an effect E in &ct(a) is contradictory, it will not generate a possible resulting 
global store in a/a. In particular, if every effect E that has its premise satisfied is 
contradictory, then action a cannot be executed (thus influencing the preconditions for 
performing a). ’ 
2.2. Synchronized actions 
For synchronized actions (ranged over by CX, possibly with a subscript), we use set 
notations with their obvious meanings. In particular, we denote by {al, . . . , a,} the 
synchronized action composed by al, . . . , an E Act. Observe that as a special case, we 
have the synchronized action [a} which is in fact simply the atomic action a, i.e., every 
atomic action is vacuously a synchronized action as well. 
We extend the previously defined successor-state function so as to cope with synchro- 
nized actions as follows. 
Definition 2.3. Let a = {al,. . . , a,}, with n 2 1, be a synchronized action, and u a global 
store (i.e., an interpretation of the propositions in Prop). The set of possible global stores 
obtained by executing o, denoted by a/o, is the set of all interpretations: 
ao(~tU...UC,) 
suchthat,fori=l,..., n, 
E 
- Li = 
I 
if 3$ s.t. (@, E) E e#ct(ai) and a($) = tt, 
0 otherwise. 
- L,U... U L, does not contain contradictory literals. 
Observe that a/{~} = a/a. Intuitively, the effects of a synchronized action are the sum 
of the effects of the participating atomic actions. For example, let a and b be two atomic 
actions whose applicable effects in a given configuration o are {A), (B) for a and {C, D} 
for b. That is, a is nondeterministic and its effect is either to set A to true, or to set B 
to true in the resulting global store, while b is deterministic and its unique effect is to 
set both C and D to true. The effect of the synchronized action {a, b) is either to set 
A, C, D to true in the resulting global store, or to set B, C, D to true. In other words, 
{a, b} nondeterministically leads to a global store, where either A, C, D is true and all 
other atomic propositions, including B, remain unaffected, or B, C, D is true, and all other 
atomic propositions, including A, remain unaffected. 
For actions a, al, ~2, with efit(u) = e@t(ul) = efSct(u2), it is easy to check that, 
if a is deterministic in a-i.e., a/u is singleton-then a/a = a/{ul, a~]. However, if a 
is nondeterministic in a-i.e., a/a is not singleton-then executing {al, a2) may have 
different effects with respect to executing a. Generally the nondeterminism of (al, ~2) 
If In fact, it has often been noticed that state change’s laws may influence preconditions of actions, see, for 
example, [40]. 
70 X.J. Chen, G. De Giucotno /Art~jificiul Intelligence 107 (1999) 63-98 
increases with respect to that of a: (at, uz] still has all the effects a has, but furthermore 
it allows to combine such effects in pairs. For example, consider some resources and two 
consumers each consuming one resource at a time. Their actions have the same effect: to 
consume one of the resource. If two consumers take the action simultaneously, then two 
resources will be taken out, while if only one consumer takes the action, there will be only 
one resource taken out. 
Let us now consider action (a. h}, where the only applicable effect of u is (A} and the 
only applicable effect of b is (-A ). Then the set of alternative global stores resulting from 
executing (a, h} is empty: cr/(~, h] = M. This means that the synchronized action (a, h} 
cannot be executed, i.e., the atomic actions u and h cannot be synchronized. In general, 
in our setting, the effects of the atomic actions that constitute a synchronized action must 
be compatible in order to perform the synchronized action. The intuition behind is this: 
synchronizing two actions means not only to perform them at the same time, but also 
to perform each of them taking into account the feedback from the others. Actions with 
conflict effects cannot be synchronized. For example, pushing and pulling a handle cannot 
be synchronized. 
Observe the difference between performing together actions a and b when they take 
into account the feedback of each other (as we assume in synchronized action (a, b)) 
and performing together a and b when they are fully independent. If a and b are 
independent, it is reasonable to assume that they can be performed together even though 
they have contradictory effects. ’ The contradiction can be resolved into nondeterminism. 
For example, let {A] and (-A] be the only applicable effect of u and b, respectively. Both u 
and b try to set the proposition A to the desired value independently. Nondeterministically, 
one of the two actions has “the last word’ and succeeds. Hence, two resulting situations 
are possible: one in which A is true, and another in which A is false. This intuition is 
formulated in our setting by adopting an interleaving semantics for concurrent processes 
as in CCS (see below). 
Finally, note that we have assumed that the effects of synchronized actions are the sum 
of those of the component actions. This is sufficient for most of the purposes, especially 
when we consider the additional modeling power that processes give us. Several alternative 
proposals for specifying effects of “compound elementary actions” have been considered 
in the literature, e.g., [2,5,24,42,50]. Many of these proposals are compatible with our 
framework (especially those based on A-family action languages 1251). In general, our 
framework applies whenever it is possible to provide a successor-state function from global 
stores to sets of global stores. 
2.3. Processes 
We adopt CCS-style constructs to combine elementary actions into processes. CCS, i.e., 
Calculus of Communicating Systems, is a well-known formalism for expressing concurrent 
processes, which includes processes constructs for sequence, choice, parallel composition, 
and restriction [45]. We suitably extend CCS in order to deal with global stores and 
synchronization of multiple actions. 
’ Discussions on this issue may be found in, e.g.. [S] 
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Due to the appearances of recursions, process equations P A p are used to define 
processes. Here P is a process name and p is a process expression (or simply process). 
Each process name is associated with a unique process definition. We will use Proc to 
denote the set of process names. 
Processes follow the syntax below: 
where nil denotes a predefined atomic process, P is a process name defined in Pmc, 
4 denotes a propositional formula over Prop, a denotes an atomic action in Act, and y 
denotes a set of expressions of the form 4 + e with 4 a propositional formula over Prop 
and @ a propositional formula over Act. 
Intuitively, process constructs have the following meaning: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
nil represents the termination of a process. 
(4 + a).p is the process which, under the “precondition” 4, is capable of 
performing the action a, and then behaves as the process p. This term can be viewed 
as an extension of CCS-term a .p where no preconditions are specified. 
p1 + p2 represents the alternative composition of p1 and ~2. 
p1 1) p2, the parallel composition of p1 and ~2, is the process which can perform 
any interleaving or synchronizations of the actions of p1 and ~2. 
p\y is the process obtained from p restricting the allowed actions to those satisfying 
the constraints in v, i.e.: 
{u I V(d + ,o) E y.(o($) = tt implies o(e) = tt)} 
where a(4) denotes the truth-value of @ in 5, and a(q) denotes the truth-value of e 
in the interpretation over Act obtained by assigning the value tt to the atomic actions 
in o and ff to those in Act - a. The restriction construct can be used to dynamically 
restrict the possibility of executing synchronized actions, thus specifying “which 
group of actions can be synchronized at what time”. Note that this construct is an 
extension of the CCS construct .\r, where y is simply a set of atomic actions that 
are not allowed. 
The semantics of a dynamic system is given in terms of the transition relation _+ _ 
defined as the least relation satisfying the set of structural rules in Table 1. Such structural 
rules have the following schema: 
ANTECEDENT 
SIDE-CONDITION 
CONSEQUENT 
which is to be interpreted logically as: 
V(ANTECEDENT A SIDE-CONDITION =k CONSEQUENT) 
where V(. . .) stands for the universal closure of all free variables occurring in (. . .). lo In 
case either the ANTECEDENT or the SIDE-CONDITION is missing, they are interpreted as 
true. 
lo Observethat,typically, ANTECEDENT, SIDE-CONDITION and CONSEQUENT sharefreevtiables. 
Table I 
Strucmral rules 
Det 
(P. 0) %,“. 0’) 
(P.n):(p’.a’l 
P = p 
Res 
(p. fr) L(,“. CT’) 
where V(I$ --t Q) E y. (n(b) = tt implies cy(e) = tt) 
(p\y.n)~(p’\y.n’) 
The rules in Table 1 have the following intuitive meaning: 
Act: 
Def: 
Sum 
Int: 
Syn: 
Res: 
The configuration ((~5 + u).p, u) can evolve to the configuration (p, (T’) by 
executing the action {u ), provided that the precondition 4 is true in 6, and O’ 
is a possible global store obtained by executing {a) in 0, i.e., (T’ E a/{~). 
The configuration (P. a), where P =i= p, can evolve to the configuration (p’, u’) 
by executing the (synchronized) action (Y, provided that (p, O) can. 
The configuration (~1 + ~2. a) can evolve to a configuration by executing the 
(synchronized) action (Y, provided that either (p 1, a) or (~2, cr ) can evolve to that 
configuration. 
The configuration (PI (I /j?, a) can evolve to the configuration (pi II ~2, a’) 
by executing the (synchronized) action a, provided that (~1, a) can evolve to 
(~;,a’) by executing cy. Similarly, (/>i (( p2,a) can evolve to (~1 (1 ~$,a’) by 
executing CX, provided that (~2, n) can evolve to (pi, G’) by executing CX. 
The configuration (~1 11 ~2, a) can evolve to the configuration (pi II pi, a’) by 
executing the (synchronized) action LX* U (~2, provided that (~1, a) can evolve to 
(p’, , a’) by executing CXI and (pz, a) can evolve to (p;, a’) by executing ~2. 
The configuration (p\v, a) can evolve to the configuration ($\~,a’) by 
executing the (synchronized) action U, provided that (p, a) can evolve to 
(p’, a’) by executing CY’, and u is allowed by y, i.e., V(q5 + e) E y. (~(4) = 
tr implies a(e) = tt). 
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We formalize the scenario by introducing a set of propositions to model the relevant 
facts, and a set of atomic actions that change the values of these facts: 
Prop = (Loaded, Alive} 
Act = {load, shoot. spin, wait] 
The effects of the actions are: 
ej%ct( load) = { (tt, (Loaded])} 
rfSct(shoot) = {(Loaded, (-Alive. -Loaded))) 
e@( spin) = {(Loaded, [Loaded]). (Loaded, (-Loaded))} 
e#ct(wait_) = {) 
which can be read as follows. Performing load results in having the gun loaded. 
Performing shoot, under the premise of having the gun loaded, results in having the 
turkey killed and the gun unloaded. If the gun is unloaded, performing shoot has no 
effect. Performing spin, under the premise of having the gun loaded, results in either 
having the gun still loaded, or having it unloaded. If the gun is unloaded, performing spin 
has no effect. Finally performing wait has no effect in any cases. 
In this scenario, at any moment, we can (I) load the gun if it is not already loaded; (2) 
shoot the turkey; (3) spin the cylinder; (4) wait. That is, at any moment, to perform the 
action load, the precondition -Loaded must be satisfied, while for the other actions, no 
preconditions are required (i.e., their preconditions are vacuously tt). We formulate these 
requirements by means of the following process: 
P k (-Loaded -+ load).P + (It + shoot).P + (tt -+ spin).P 
+ (tt -+ wait).P 
Observe that process P is very simple: it performs an action, whose precondition is 
satisfied, and becomes itself. In other words, while the configuration evolves since the 
effects of the actions change the status of the global store, the process remains always in 
the same status. Obviously, in this case, the number of possible configurations depends 
only on the number of possible global stores, which is at most 21pr0”‘. 
The form of the above process is typical of those formalisms for reasoning about actions 
that concentrate only on the specification of elementary actions, specifying preconditions 
and effects for them, and do not specify explicitly any process. In these cases, the following 
process is, in fact, implicitly assumed (note that it has exactly the form of the one above): 
P A C($j + LZi). P 
where ui are the actions and 4i are their preconditions. 
Once we have specified the process and how actions change the global store, for every 
initial global store, it is possible to compute all possible evolutions of the system. For 
example, let the initial configuration be described by (Pinit, Dinit) with Pinit = P and 
ainit = {Alive. -Loaded]. From (Pinit, Dinit), using the structural rules in Table 1, we 
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Fig. l.Trausition systemfortheRussiauTurkey Shoot. 
generate the transition system 7 in Fig. 1, which summarizes in a graph all possible 
evolutions of the configurations of the system. For example, a possible evolution is: 
(P,(Alive,-Loaded))+ load (P,(Alive,Loaded])walt‘(P,(Alive,Loaded]) 
s(P,{-Alive,-Loaded}) 
that results in having killed the turkey. Another example is: 
(P,(Alive,-Loaded)) load +(P,(Alive,Loaded])+ "In (P,(Alive,-Loaded}) 
s(P,{Alive,-Loaded)) 
that results in not having killed the turkey. Another one is: 
(P,{Alive,-Loaded))+ load (P,(Alive,Loaded])~(P,{Alive,Loaded]) 
-(P,(-Alive,-Loaded]) 
that results in having killed the turkey. 
What about if we do not have complete information on the initial situation? A straight- 
forward technique to deal with this is to trade the lack of information with nondeterminism. 
For example, we may prefix the actual process with a sequence of dummy atomic actions 
that nondeterministically lead to several global stores according to incomplete informa- 
tion on the initial situation. In the above scenario, we may introduce two dummy actions 
initAlive and initloaded. Assuming that initially it is known that the turkey is 
alive but it is not known whether the gun is loaded: 
_ we specify 
efSct(initAlive)= {(tt,(Alive))} 
efScct(initLoaded)= ((tt,(Loaded)),(tt,{-Loaded])} 
_ we prefix the above process P by an initialization sequence (the order of the dummy 
actions can be arbitrary) getting the new process 
Q A (tt+ initAlive).(tt+ initLoaded).P 
- we arbitrarily settbeinitial global storea, = {-Alive,-Loaded}. 
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Observe that the new initial configuration (Q, a(,) is forced to evolve by first executing the 
initialization sequence, and then evolve according to the original process P. After executing 
the initialization sequence, our partial knowledge on the initial situation will be correctly 
taken into account. 
3.2. Lifting a tuhk 
In this example, we illustrate a process denoting the concurrent activities of more 
agents, showing parallel execution of processes (interpreted by interleaving semantics) and 
synchronization of atomic actions. Interrupts are also briefly discussed. 
The scenario is the following. A vase is on top of a table. If just one side of the 
table is lifted then the vase falls onto the floor. While if both sides of the table are lifted 
simultaneously, the vase does not fall. 
We formalize the scenario by introducing the following primitive propositions and 
atomic actions: 
Prop = (VaseOnTable,DownLeftSide.DownRightSide] 
Act = (vaseFalls.downLeft,downRight.upLeft.upRight} 
The effects of the atomic actions are the obvious ones: 
eflcl(vaseFalls)=((~.(-VaseOnTable])) 
eflct(downLeft)=((-DownLeftSide.(DownLeftSide})} 
@ct(downRight) =((-DownRightSide.(DownRightSide})] 
Q$ct(upLeft)=((DownLeftSide.(-DownLeftSide})) 
@ct(upRight) =((DownRightSide,(-DownRightSide})) 
where 4 = ((DownLeftSide A -DownRightSide) V (YDownLeftSide A 
DownRightSide))AVaseOnTable. 
In this scenario, we have three processes going on concurrently: agent Al who may 
either raise or put down the left side of the table; agent A, who is in control of right side of 
the table; the environment Env that makes the vase fall off the table as soon as one of the 
sides of the table is risen while the other side is not. We model these concurrent activities 
by a process LT defined as follows: 
AlA(-DownLeftSide+downLeft).Ai 
+(DownLeftSide+upLeft).Al 
A,-(-DownRightSide-+ downRight).A, 
+(DownRightSide-+upRight).A, 
Env-(4+vaseFalls).Env 
LT-(Al IIA, I/ Env)\(4-+vaseFallsA-others] 
where others denotes the disjunction of all atomic actions other than vaseFalls 
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(IT, IV, L a)) 
ur 
(L-4 tv, L, -a)) 
(LT, {V, +., +) 
(LT, i?f, -L, a)) 
dr 
Fig. 2. Transition system for the Lifting a Table. 
Observe that the vase can fall only when the precondition 4 is satisfied. Furthermore, 
because of the restriction .\{$ -+ vaseFalls A -others) in LT, whenever the vase has 
the possibility to fall, it is forced to do so, while all other atomic actions are blocked. I2 
Let the initial configuration be: I3 
(pinit, qinit) = (LT, (VaseOnTable, DownLef tSide, DownRightSide)). 
By making use of the structural rules in Table 1, it is possible to build the corresponding 
transition system, as shown in Fig. 2. The figure uses obvious abbreviations to denote 
propositions and actions: propositions VaseOnTable, DownLef tSide, DownRight 
Side are denoted by V, L, R, respectively, and actions vaseFalls, downleft, 
downRight, upLef t, upRight are denoted by vf, dl, dr, ul, ur, respectively. The 
initial configuration (Pinit, ginit) is denoted by the node labeled by (LT, (V, L, R}). 
It is possible to check that the behavior of the system is the expected one. For instance, 
in (Pinit, Dinit), the subprocess Env cannot execute since a(@) =#. Instead both A1 and A, 
can proceed performing upLef t and upRight, respectively. However, unless upLef t 
and upRight synchronize, the condition C$ will be true in the successive configuration 
and hence the vase will be forced to fall. If the synchronized action {upRight, upLef t) 
is performed, then C$ will not be true and hence the vase won’t fall. 
Note that, the process Env in LT can be seen as a process which, when certain conditions 
are met (c#J), performs an interrupt (the action vaseFalls) and allows for the further 
execution of the other concurrent processes (A1 and A,) only when the interrupt is 
completed (the action vaseFal Is terminates). More generally, an interrupt will set the 
truth-value of certain flags that are in the preconditions of other actions, thus disallowing 
their executions. In this way, we can build interrupting processes that block the execution of 
the other processes, execute without interferences from them, and reset the flags only when 
the interrupt has been fully handled allowing for the other processes to be resumed and 
‘* Note that, if we weaken the restriction in LT to be .\(@ + vaseFalls),then wewill StillforcevaseFalls 
to be executed whenever 0 is true, but the action to make the vase fall will be allowed to synchronize with other 
actions. 
I3 Note that LT behaves correctly under any other initial global store. And it is easy to verify that it generates 
the same transition system from every initial global stores (obviously modulo the initial configuration). 
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continue.Similarly,wecan also buildprocessesthat blocktheexecutionofotherprocesses, 
without ever allowing them to regain the control. I4 
3.3. Relq ruce 
In this example, we show a more complex process constituted by various subprocesses in 
which synchronization plays a key role. The example also illustrates a simple but effective 
technique to deal with actions that are not instantaneous, but have a duration (see [48,50, 
591). Namely, an action that has a duration of “running” is modeled by: 
(1) an (instantaneous) atomic action st artRun denoting the initiation of the action; 
(2) a proposition Running in the global store denoting that the action has started but 
not yet completed; 
(3) an (instantaneous) atomic action endRun denoting the termination of the action. 
The scenario is a “relay race” with two competing teams, each composed of two runners. 
The rules of the race are the following: 
( I ) when the “go” signal is given, the first runner of each team may start running; 
(2) when the first runner reaches the “100 meters line”, the second runner may start 
running; 
(3) when the two runners of the same team are both running, the first runner may pass 
the baton along to the second runner; 
(4) the team, whose second runner arrives first to the “finish line” with the baton, wins. 
We formalize the scenario by introducing the following primitive propositions and 
atomic actions (i = I. 2 denotes the team, j = I,2 denotes the runner): 
Prop = {Running;,j,lOOmLinePassed;,1,Baton;,,;. 
FinishLinePassed,.2,Won, ) i.j = 1,2} 
Act = (startRun;.i,endRuni,j.passlOOmLinei,I.passFinishLine;,2. 
giveBaton;,,,getBaton;,l.winsi.go 1 i,,j = 1,2) 
The effects of the atomic actions are the obvious ones: 
e&(startRun,.;))= ((-Running,.,. (Runningi.j])} 
efSct(endRun;,,;))= ((Runningi,j, (7Runningi,,j])] 
e$?ct(passlOOmLine;,~)=((-lOOmLinePasse&.l, 
(lOOmLinePassed;,~})) 
efSc?(passFinishLinei,z)=((-FinishLinePassedi,z, 
(FinishLinePassed;.z))) 
efScct(giveBaton;.I)= {(Baton;,l,(-Baton;,!])} 
f$ct(getBatoni,2)= ((1Batoni.?, {Batoni,z})} 
I4 Priorities among processes can also be easily modeled, by inserting suitable flags in the preconditions of their 
actions. 
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efSct(winsi)= {(-(Won1 VWorq),{WOni})} 
e%f(go) = 0 
The various activities involved in the scenario are described by the following processes 
(we abbreviate (tt -+ a).p by a.p and tt + Q by Q): 
Runneri,] A startRuni,l.passlOOmLinei,l.giveBatoni,l.endRuni,l.nil 
Runneri. -(lOOmLinePassed,l -+ startRuni,2).getBatoni,2. 
Teami -(Runneri,l )I Runneri,2)\((giveBatoni,1 =getBatoni~)) 
CheckWinner-wins1 .nil+ winsz.nil 
RR-((Ready+ go).(Teaml 11 Team;! 11 CheckWinner)\ 
((passFinishLinel,2 =winsl)A(passFinishLine2,2=wins2)) 
where 
Ready= Ai(AjlRunningi,j A-lOOmLinePassed,l A 
-FinishLinePassed,lABatoni,l A-Batoni,~A-Woni). 
Let us explain the above processes. The process Runneri, describes the activities of 
the first runner of the team i: the first runner starts running, passes the 100 meters line, 
passes the baton along to the second runner, and ends running. 
The process Runneri, describes the activities of the second runner of the team i: the 
second runner starts running provided that the first process has already reached the 100 
meters line, gets the baton from the first runner, passes the Finish line, and ends running. 
The process Tern describes the activities of the team i. It consists of the concurrent 
composition of the two processes Runneri, 1 and Runneri, with the restriction that the 
actions giveBatoni, 1 and getBatoni.2 must be performed synchronously. 
The process CheckWinner describes the activity that establishes if the first or the 
second team wins. 
The process RR describes all the activities of the system. It consists of the concur- 
rent composition of the three processes Teamt, Team2 and CheckWinner prefixed 
by the action go that starts the race under suitable preconditions, and with the restric- 
tion that the actions passFinishLinet,2 and winst, and, respectively, the actions 
passFinishLine2,z and winsz, must be executed synchronously, thus forcing the ac- 
tivity described by CheckWinner to declare the true winner. 
As in the previous examples, by using the structural rules in Table 1, it is possible to 
build the transition system generated by the given initial configuration to make explicit all 
possible evolutions of the scenario. 
3.4. Translating whi 1 e programs 
As the last example, we show that the process description formalism presented here 
can easily represent raditional programming constructs like “while” and “if-then-else”. In 
particular, we show how programs of a simple sequential programming language, called 
While, can be translated into processes. While programs have the following syntax: 
where CI is a generic atomic action whose effects are specified by the effect function 
as before, and the other constructs are sequential composition, if-then-else, and while. 
respectively. 
To define the translation, we first introduce function rr detined inductively on the 
structure of Whi le programs. For every process 17: 
fr(u. p) = (tt + a).p 
tr(61: 62. p) = tr(8l. tr(S2. p)) 
tr(if $ then 61 else&, p)= (4 + nop).tr(Sl. p)+ C-q5 --t nop).tr(&.p) 
tr(while 4 do 6. p) = Q where Q is a new process name dehned as: 
Q A (4 + nop).tr(J. Q) + (-4 - nap)./' 
where nop is a special atomic action which has no effects on the global store. It is used to 
reflect the fact that tests are assumed to make a transition. ” Then, we define the translation 
of a While program 6 as the process ~(6. nil). 
Observe that the intuitive meaning of the constructs is correctly captured by the resulting 
process. For example, while-loops are translated into processes that behave as follows: 
first. the entering condition of the while is tested; if such condition is true then the process 
behaves as the body of the while followed by the whole while-loop again; if the condition 
is false then it exits the loop. I6 
For example, the following fragment of control code of an elevator: 
6 = while ~GroundFloor do goDownOneFloor: openDoor 
is translated into: 
Q + ~~GroundFloor- - nop).(tt ---f goL)o~~tlOrleFloor). Q $ 
(GroundFloor ---, nop).(tt + openDoor).nil 
4. Reasoning formalism: the logic M,, 
Once we have had a representation of a dynamic system, we can use such a 
representation to infer properties of the system, like the possibility to reach a configuration 
where a certain property holds (i.e., where a certain “goal” is satisfied), or the invariance 
of certain statements, etc. 
” If such assumption i\ not made. the translation can be modified accordingly. 
” One could define derived structural rule< for the various comtructa of While on the bahi? of the asociated 
processes, and verify that such rules correspond to those usually associated to such constructs (see, e.g.. 1261). 
A thorough discussion on this is out of the hope of the paper. 
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Among the various temporal and modal logics that have been proposed in the process 
algebra literature for verifying properties of concurrent systems [17,28,43], we focus on 
one of the most powerful logics of programs which is called modal mu-calculus ([ 19,32, 
33X573). Modal mu-calculus is a logic of programs, which is strictly more expressive 
than logics like PDL, APDL, CTL and CTL*. It has been proposed as a logic for expressing 
“temporal” properties of reactive and parallel processes in [9,12,36,54,55,62]. We refer to 
the excellent tutorial article [55] for a thorough introduction on modal mu-calculus and its 
use in the context of concurrent processes. 
In this paper, we introduce an extension of standard modal mu-calculus, called M,, 
which allows for boolean combinations of atomic actions in the modalities, and thus, it is 
suitable to verify properties of systems specified in our representation formalism. 
4.1. The logic M, 
The logic M, is basically constituted by three kinds of components: 
_ Propositions to denote properties of the global store in a given configuration. 
- Modalities to denote the capability of performing certain actions in a given 
configuration. 
- Least and greatestfixpoint constructs to denote “temporal” properties of the system, 
typically defined by induction and coinduction. 
The formulae of M, are defined on the base of action formulae generated by the 
following abstract syntax: 
e::=aIanyInoneI-elel~ezIe1Ve2 
where a E A for some fixed set A of atomic actions, any is a special atomic action denoting 
the union of all actions in A, and none is a special atomic action denoting the empty 
(nonexecutable) action. 
The meaning of a generic action formula is given by the satisfaction relation below, 
where a! is a set of atomic actions (denoting a synchronized action in general): 
ob=a iffaEcr 
o +any (always) 
(Y + none (never) 
ah--e iffnot a! +Q 
o !=el ne2 iffo l=e~ anda be2 
(11 keel Ve2 iffa keel ora be2 
Note that not all constructs in action formulae are independent. In particular, we have: 
none = a A -a, any = -none, QI V ~2 = -(-@I A -4. 
Formulae of M, are formed inductively from action formulae, primitive propositions in 
some fixed set ‘P, and variable symbols in some fixed set kr, according to the following 
abstract syntax: 
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where A is a primitive proposition in P, X is a variable symbol in Vat-, and Q is an action 
formula over A. 
The symbols F and v can be considered as quantifiers, and in the sequel, we make 
use of notions of scope, bound and free occurrences of variables, closed formulas, etc. 
The definitions of these notions are the same as in first-order logic, treating k and u as 
quantifiers. 
As usual in mu-calculus, for formulae of the form bX.0 and uX.0, we require the 
s_wrractic monotonicity of @J with respect to X: every occurrence of the variable X in @ 
must be within the scope of an even number of negation signs. This requirement guarantees 
the existence of the least and the greatest fixpoints associated with <p (see below). 
The semantics of M, is based on the notions of transition system and valuation. Given 
a transition system 7. a valuation V on ‘7 is a mapping from variables in Var to subsets of 
the states in 7. 
Given a valuation V, we denote by V[X/&], the valuation identical to V except for 
IJ[X/&](X) = E, i.e., for every variable Y. 
1 & if Y = x, wxlay) = y(y) if y _# .f. 
Let 7 = (S, (R, 1 a E 2A}, I7) be a transition system with I7 mapping propositions 
in P to subsets of S, and V a valuation on 7. We assign meaning to M,, formulae by 
associating to 7 and V an extension ,finction (.)c, which maps M, formulae to subsets 
of S. The extension function (.); is defined inductively as follows: 
(A); = U(A) c S 
(tt); = s 
Wgi=M 
(-a$ = s - (a$ 
‘T 
(@I v @2)v = (@)I) 1 u (@2) ; c 
C(Q)@); = {s E S I 3x, s’. (Y k Q and (s. .s’) E R, and s’ E (@)c) 
([Q]@); = (s ES 1 Vcz. s’. cy + Q and (.c, .s’) E R, implies s’ E (@)$} 
(llX.@); = n (E E s I w$!& c q 
ww; = u {E s s I f c (@&q} 
cx,; = V(X) c: s 
Intuitively, the extension function (.)c assigns to the various constructs of M,, the 
following meanings: 
- The boolean connectives have the expected meaning. 
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- The extension of (e)@ includes the states s E S such that starting from S, there is an 
execution of some action satisfying e that leads to a successive state S’ included in the 
extension of 0. 
- The extension of [e]@ includes the states s such that starting from S, each execution 
of an action satisfying e leads to some successive state s’ included in the extension 
of@. 
- The extension of pX.@ is the smallest subset EP of S such that, assigning to X the 
extension EP, the resulting extension of @ is contained in E*. That is, the extension of 
pX.@ is the leastfipoint of the operator I&.(@)c,x,E . The syntactic monotonicity 
of @ with respect to X guarantees the monotonicity o I? such operator and hence, by 
the Tarski-Knaster Theorem [SS], the unique existence of the least fixpoint. 
- Similarly, the extension of uX.Q, is the greatest subset E, of S such that, assigning 
to X the extension Ev, the resulting extension of @ contains E,. That is, the 
extension of uX.@ is the greutestfipoint of the operator M.(Q)&,,, . The syntactic 
monotonicity of @ with respect to X guarantees the monotonicity o 1 such operator 
and hence, by the Tarski-Knaster Theorem [58], the unique existence of the greatest 
fixpoint. 
Note that not all the M, constructs are independent. In particular, we have: 8 = 
A A -A; tt = -8; @1 v 02 = -(+i+ A -@2); [e]@ = -(e)-@; and vX.@ = 
-@X.-@[X/-X], where @[X/-X] is the formula obtained by substituting all free 
occurrences of X by the formula -X. We also use @t + @2 as an abbreviation for 
-@r v #2. 
Let us consider some interesting examples of M, formulae (we assume that the scope 
of /-L and v extends to the right as much as possible): 
( 1) (e) tt expresses the capability of executing some action satisfying e. 
(2) [e]fS states the inability of executing any action satisfying e. 
(3) (any)tt A [-elf indicates the inevitability/necessity of executing some action 
satisfying e . 
(4) ,uX.@ v (any)X expresses that there exists an evolution of the system such that @ 
eventually holds. Indeed, its extension E/1 is the smallest set that includes (1) the 
states in the extension of @; and (2) the states that can execute an action leading 
to a successive state that is in 8,. In other words, the extension &P includes each 
state s such that there exists a run from s leading eventually (i.e., in a finite number 
of steps) to a state in the extension of @. Note the inductive nature of this property 
which is typical of properties defined by least fixpoint. 
(5) uX.@ A [any]X-i.e., -(@X.-Q v (any)X)-expresses the invariance of @ under 
all of the evolutions of the system. Indeed, its extension E, is the largest set of states 
in the extension of @ from which every executable action leads to a successive state 
which is still in E,. In other words, the extension I, includes each state s such that 
every state along every run from s is in the extension of @. Note the coinductive 
nature of this property which is typical of properties defined by greatest fixpoint. 
(6) pX.0 v ((any)tt A [any]X) expresses that for all evolutions of the system, 0 
eventudly holds. Indeed, its extension EP is the smallest set that includes (1) the 
states in the extension of @; and (2) the states that can execute an action and such 
that every executable action leads to a state in EP. In other words, the extension EP 
includes each state s such that every run from s leads eventually (i.e., in a finite 
number of steps) to a state in the extension of @. 
In general, M, allows for expressing very sophisticated properties of dynamic systems, 
such as forms of liweness, sufet,v, and also fairness [55]. For example, the formula 
uX.~Y.[u](( (h)tt A X) v Y) expresses a fairness constraint: h is possible infinitely often 
throughout any inlinite length run consisting wholly of a actions. 
Finally, note that if @ is closed (no free variables are present in 4), as in the examples 
above, then the extension of (@),I is in fact independent of the valuation V. It is usual to 
say that u closed @ is true irz u stute .F qf’the trunsition .system I iff s E (@)c for any 
valuation V (the extension of @ is in fact independent of V with CD closed). 
4.2. Model checking 
In the setting proposed in this paper, the reasoning problem of interest is model checking: 
given a transition system and one of its states, verify whether a certain closed formula is 
true in such a state. The formal definition of model checking in our setting is then the 
following one. 
Definition 4.1. Let 7 = (S. (R, 1 a E 2A}. L7) be a transition system with n mapping 
propositions in P to subsets of S, let s E S be one of its states, and let Q, be a closed (no 
free variables are present) M,, formula. The related model checking problem is to verify 
whether 
where V is any valuation. since @ is closed. 
In the following we abbreviate s E (0,); by 7. s /= @ or simply by .s t= @ referring 
to I only implicitly. 
5. Reasoning about actions 
Having presented both the representation formalism and the reasoning formalism, we 
can discuss how reasoning about actions is done in this setting. The basic idea is to use 
model checking. 
Specilically, given an initial configuration ( p,,,;!. q,?;,) and a M, formulae @, we verify: 
(P~,it. flinit) k @ 
where the transition system we are implicitly referring to is the (pin{,. ai,,;,)-generated 
transition system. 
Let us consider some examples. First, consider the Russian Turkey scenario in Section 3 
with plnlt = P and o,,,ir = (Alive. -Loaded). We can verify that: 
(yi,?;j,(Ti,l;r) + ((load)(wait)(shoot)tt) A ([load][wait][shoot]-Alive) 
that is. the sequence of actions load. wait, shoot can be performed and (necessarily) 
results in having killed the turkey. Observe that, this is a typical instance of the so called 
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projection problem: given an initial configuration and a sequence of actions, determine the 
truth-value of a certain fact in the resulting configuration. 
The nondeterminism of the action spin is reflected in the following property: 
(pinir,qnit) b ((load)(spin)(shoot)Alive) A 
((load)(spin)(shoot)-Alive) 
that is, the sequence of actions load, spin, shoot may result either in having killed the 
turkey or not. However it (necessarily) results in having unloaded the gun, since 
(pinit, Oinir) b ((load)(spin)(shoot)tt) A ([load][spin][shoot]-Loaded). 
Consider now the following instance of model checking: 
(Pinit, Dinit) I= PX.& V (w)X. 
It expresses the existence of a (not yet determined) sequence of actions that, starting from 
the initial configuration, can reach a configuration where & is true. 
If only deterministic atomic actions are allowed, then the one above is a formalization 
of the planning problem: it asks for a sequence of actions-a plan-to reach the goal C& 
starting from the initial configuration. Thus, we may do planning by using model checking 
techniques. 
If nondeterministic atomic actions are allowed, the above formalization of planning is 
too weak since it expresses only the possibility that a certain sequence of actions achieves 
the goal. For example, in the Russian Turkey scenario 
(Pinit, oiinit) b hX.-Alive V (any)X 
is verified by the sequence of actions load, spin, shoot, yet the execution of 
load, spin, shoot does not necessarily achieves the goal of having killed the turkey, 
as shown in Section 3.1. 
However, we can still formalize the planning problem as follows: 
(Pinit, Dinit) k FX.#g v V (Q)tt A [alX 
OEACf 
which expresses the existence of a (not yet determined) sequence of actions that, starting 
from the initial configuration, necessarily reaches a configuration where C& is true. For 
example, in the Russian Turkey scenario 
(Pinif 7 Qinit ) + ,xX.-Alive V V (a)ttr\ [a]X 
LlEACf 
is verified by the sequence of actions load, wait, shoot, but not by load, spin, 
shoot. I7 
” If concurrency is taken into account, the planning problem become more involved, since issues such as which 
agent is in control of a given atomic action, which agent is supposed to execute a given plan (or part of a plan), 
etc., become relevant. Moreover, other forms of planning, which are closer to the synthesis of a control process 
than to the generation of a sequence of actions, may be more appropriate in this context. Although some of these 
issues can be tackled within the proposed setting, we do not discuss them further here. 
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Next, consider the case discussed at the end of Section 3.1 where we have incomplete 
information on the initial situation (in particular, we do not know whether the gun is 
loaded). Checking whether a property @ holds in the initial situation is reduced to checking 
whether 
(Q..sy)b [initAlivej[initLoaded]@ 
that is, checking whether @ is true in every configuration right after the initialization 
sequence. ‘s For example, even if we do not know whether the gun is loaded, we can 
verify that there exists a plan to kill the turkey: 
(Q,s,)b [initAlive][initLoaded] 
( 
I-LX.1AliveV V (u)tr A [a]X 
treilct > 
It is easy to see that a possible plan is: load followed by shoot. 
Let us now consider the Lifting a Table scenario as formalized in Section 3. Let the 
initial configuration be (Pini,, oinir) with: 
Pinit = LT and oinlt = (VaseOnTable. DownLef tSide, DownRightSide]. 
We can verify that if agents Al and Ar raise the table synchronously, then the vase won’t 
fall on the floor. 
(Pinit.Crinit) /= [upLeft A upRight][vaseFalls]#. 
Instead, if they do not synchronize, the vase falls off the table: 
(Pinit,fliait) b [(upLeft A-upRight)V (1upLeftA upRight)] 
(any]-VaseOnTable. 
We can also prove that whenever the vase can fall, it does fall: “) 
(Pinit,o;nir) b YX.((vaseFalls)tt=+ (any)ttA [-vaseFalls]ff) A [any]X. 
Finally, consider the Relay Race scenario as formalized in Section 3. Let the initial 
configuration be (Pinit, ginit) with Pi,lir = RR and o;rlit such that Ready is true. We can 
verify that at the beginning, the action go must be executed: 
(Yii*it~ oiinit) k (!7o)ft A [lSOl.,f 
That is, in the initial configuration go is executable, and (synchronized) actions not 
including go are not executable. In fact, it is easy to verify that no other atomic action 
is executable. 
We can also verify that both teams may win: 
(Pinitr ai.nit) I= WX.Wonl V (any)W A WX.Won2 V (any)X) 
That is, from the initial configuration, there exists an execution where team 1 wins and 
there exists an execution where team 2 wins. Moreover, for all executions, either team 1 or 
team 2 wins: 
(Pinit, ~init) k M.(Wonl V Won21 V bwlX 
I8 Note that, it is always possible to execute the initialization sequence. 
“Even when we weaken the restriction in LT to be .\[@ + vaseFalls] 
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Furthermore, it is impossible that both teams win. Indeed, we can verify that as soon as 
one of the team wins, the other cannot win anymore. 
(Pinit,ainit) /= uX.((Wonl * uY.7Won:! A [any]Y> A 
(Won2 =+ uY.-Won1 A [any]Y)) A[any]X 
That is, in every configuration, if Won1 (Won2) is true, then Won2 (Won]) is false from 
then on along all possible configuration’s evolutions. 
6. Reasoning techniques 
In this section, we derive a technique to perform model checking within the proposed 
setting. We do so, by devising two transformation functions: 
- A transformation F from transition systems whose arcs represent sets of atomic 
actions (synchronized actions) to transition systems whose arcs represent single 
atomic actions. 
- A transformation H from M, formulae, which allow for boolean combinations of 
atomic actions in the modalities, to standard modal mu-calculus formulae, which 
allow only for single atomic actions in the modalities. 
The setting resulting from applying such transformations is a standard one for which 
various model checking techniques have been developed (see, e.g., [19,55]). Hence, by 
means of the transformations F and H, we can make use of such model checking 
techniques. 
The idea at the base of the transformations F and H is to reify transitions, i.e., to 
introduce a new state for each transition, so that the action formula is transformed into 
a formula on the new state. Fig. 3 illustrates the reification: 
_ Fig. 3(a) illustrates the original transition from the state s to the state t. We have 
that (s, t) E 72, and a, (aI) is the propositional interpretation associated with s 
(f). It assigns to each primitive proposition A E P the truth-value tt iff s E n(A) 
(t E n(A)). 
- Fig. 3(b) illustrates the resulting reified transition constituted by the transition from 
the state s to a newly introduced state, denoted by (s, cx, t), and the transition from 
(s, 01, t) to the state t. We require that (1) (s, (s, CX, t)) E R,, and ((s, a, t), t) E Rw2; 
(2) CT, and at be the propositional interpretations associated with s and t , respectively 
(the same as in the original transition); (3) Us be the propositional interpretation 
associated with (s, cx!, t), which assigns to each atomic action a E A the truth-value 
ttiffaEa. 
Fig. 3. Transition reification: (a) the original one; (b) the transformed one. 
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Definition 6.1. Let A be a set of actions and P a set of propositions. Given transition 
system 7 = (S, {‘I& 1 a E 2d}. I7) with I7 mapping propositions in P to subsets of S, we 
define: 
F(7) = (ST {R;, , R&l. q 
where 
SF=Su((s.~,t)/~~AA,(s.t)~R,} 
r,;, = ((.I.. (s, (Y, t)) I a c A. (.s. f) E R,} 
R;, = {(s. a. t), t) Icy c A. (s. t) E R,} 
nF(p) = (s I s E l7(p)] foreach p E P 
nF(~)={(~.~,t)I(~..s’)~Rol. USA) foreachaEd. 
In addition, given a valuation V on I, we define: 
F(V)(X) = (s / s E V(X)) for each X E Var. 
Observe that, arcs in the transition system F(7) can only be labeled by either WI or ~2. 
Definition 6.2. Given a M, formula @, we define H (@) inductively as follows: 
H(A) = A H((Q)@) = (u~~)(e A (~,2)ff(@)) 
H (tt) = tt H([el@) = lwll(e =+ [wzlH(@)) 
Hcfs) =.f H(pX.@) = FX.H(@) 
H(-CD) = -H(Q) H(uX.@) = uX.H(@) 
H(Ql A ~32) = H(q) A H(@z) H(X) = X 
H(@1v@2)=H(@~)vH(@2) 
Observe that, H (0) is a standard modal mu-calculus formula, since only single actions 
(W 1 or ~2) may appear in the modalities. 
Theorem 6.3. Let transition system 7 = (S, (I?,, / a! E 2d), I7). The size of F(7) is 
linearly bounded by the size of 7. 
Proof. For any transition system T, let state-no.(l) and edge-no.(l) denote the number 
of the states in 7 and the number of the edges in I, respectively. By the definition of 
F, we have that state_no.(F(I)) = state-no.(l) + edge-no.(I), and edge_no.(F(I)) = 
2 x edge-no.(l). q 
Theorem 6.4. Let 0 be u M, jtirmula. The size of H (@) is linearly bounded by the size 
Of@. 
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Proof. Let size(@) denote the size of formula @. It is easy to verify by induction on the 
structure of the formula @, that size(H(0)) -C c. size(@). q 
Theorem 6.5. Let transition system 7 = (S, {7& ) (Y E 2*}, A’) and @ a M, formula. 
Then for every valuation V on 7 and for every s E S, we have: 
Proof. First, we show by induction on the structure of Q that: 
((s, s’) E R, and a! + Q) iff (s, (Y, s’) E (p)$i. 
Indeed, for Q = a: if (s, s’) E R, and a! b a-i.e., a E a-then, by definition of F(I), we 
have (s, U, s’) E LfF(a); on the converse, if (s, CY, s’) E nF(a) then, again by definition of 
F(I), we have (s, s’) E R, and a E (Y, i.e., (Y b a. For the other cases, the result follows 
immediately by the induction hypothesis. 
Now, we are ready to prove the thesis of the theorem. Without loss of generality, we 
restrict our attention to formulae @ of the form: 
@ ::= A ] -4 1 @t A 02 ] (Q)@ ] pX.0 ] X. 
The proof is given by the induction on the number of nested fixpoints constructs I-LX.@. 
Base case. If no fixpoint constructs are present in @, then we can verify that the thesis 
holds by the induction of the structure of @ . All cases are immediate except the case: 
s E ((@P); iff s E ((~4 )(e A (u~)H(p)))$i 
that we prove below. 
(=+) By definition of $, s E ((Q) P); implies that there exist (Y and s’ such that 
(s, s’) E R,, o + Q, and s’ E PT. By induction hypothesis, we have s’ E !PT iff 
s’ E (H(@)),(v). W-J By the definition of F(I), we have ((s, CZ, s’), s’) E R& , so we have 
(s, a, s’) E ((~2vw’))F(1/)~ F(7) Moreover since (s, s’) E Rcr and a b Q, we have (s, o, s’) + 
(e) F$i. Finally, by definition of F(I), we have (s, (s, CZ, s’)) E R$, . Hence, we can 
concludes E ((wt)(e A (uJ~)H(!P)))$~. 
(‘_) By definition of .:I;;, s E ((wt)(e A (w~)H(~P)))F$ implies that there exist 
o and s’ such that (s, (s, CY, s’)) E R&, ((s, a, s’), s’) E Ri,, (s, a, s’) E (p)~$~ and s’ E 
(H(ly));;;;. By induction hypothesis, we have s’ E i&T iff s’ E (H(q))::;;. Moreover, 
F(I) 
since (sj o?;(‘&+ (@)F(V)3 we have (s, s’) E R, and u k Q. Hence, we can conclude 
s E ((e)@)F(V). 
Inductive case. Let us assume that the thesis holds for the formula @ with k nested 
fixpoint constructs. We prove it for @J = pX. P with k + 1. We recall that, by the Tarski- 
Knaster Theorem on fixpoints [%I, s E (PX.P)~ iff there exists an ordinal t such that 
s E (~6 X. iP)$, where (J.L~ X. iP); is defined by transfinite induction as: 
- (pu~X.ly)c = &(l(tX.P)i, if h is a limit ordinal. 
We proceed by transfinite induction on ordinals 6. 
Base case of the tramfinite induction. p0X.q is defined as,fJ‘, thus trivially we have 
s E (peX.U)c iff s E (~(jX.H(P))~j~~. 
Successor cuse of’ the transjinite itzduction. We want to show that s E &+I X.S)c iff 
s E (CL<+IX.H(*),:;;;. which, by definition, reduces to: 
Since P contains k fixpoint constructs, by inductive hypothesis on k, we have: 
So it remains to prove that: 
Notice that the two valuations above may differ only on the value of X. If it holds that: 
(1) 
(3) 
then by straightforward induction on the formation of H(P), we have that (2) holds as 
well. Let us prove (3), which can be written as: 
.s E F(“[XIw~X.w;])(X) iff s E ~(U)[X/(~~X.H(~))~~~~](X). 
By definition of F on valuations, this reduces to: 
s E (weX.V); iff .Y E (IL~X.H(~))::~( 
which indeed holds by transfinite inductive hypothesis. 
Hence, considering (1) and (2), we can conclude that s E (P~+IX.@)~ iff s E 
(M+,X.H~‘J’));~;)‘. 
Limit case of the transfinitr induction. Let i, be a limit ordinal, then s E (phX.P)c iff 
there exists an ordinal 6 < h such that s E (~ugX.9);. By transfinite induction hypothesis, 
it holds that s E &X.*)5 iff s E (~~X.H(*))~:~~. and thus 
s E (j&x.*)‘; iff ,s E (p~.X.H(+))ric;. 
This completes the transfinite induction. So for all ordinals 6 it holds that 
s E (kcX.P)c iff s E (pcX.H(@))F$:. 
The induction on the nesting of fixpoint constructs is completed as well, hence we have 
proven the theorem. q 
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Theorem 6.5 gives us a sound and complete technique to do model checking in the 
setting proposed in this paper. To check if 
7,sb@ 
check if 
F(7), s b H(Q). 
Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 which state that F(7) and H (@) are linearly related to 7 and @, 
respectively, allow us to conclude that such a technique is, in fact, quite efficient. 
The problem of model checking a standard mu-calculus formula in a finite transition 
system is known to be in NP fl coNP [21]. Model checking algorithms are known that run 
in (171 . PI) Ock) [22] where 171 is the size of the transition system 7, (@I is the size , 
of the formula @, and k is the number of “alternating” least and greatest fixpoints whose 
variables are one within the scope of the other (see [19]). Moreover, the properties that 
are typically of interest can be expressed with a very small number of alternating fixpoints 
(one or two), and hence typically model checking can be performed within a low order 
polynomial time. By Theorems 6.3 and 6.4, such results can be applied immediately to our 
setting. *O 
We conclude the section by observing that, from a practical point of view, the above 
transformations allow us to use the software tools such as the Edinburgh Concurrency 
Workbench [lo] *’ or the Concurrency Workbench of North Carolina [ 111, ** that have 
been implemented for the automated model checking of standard modal mu-calculus 
formulae. 
7. Further issues on reasoning about dynamic systems 
In this section, we discuss two important issues related to the representation of and 
reasoning on dynamic systems. 
First, we relate model checking in our setting to logical implication, showing that the 
former is a special case of the latter. We get this special case when we have enough 
information to isolate a single model, hence reducing logical implication to the simple 
verification of the truth-value of a formula. 
Second, we discuss the issue of equivalent descriptions. In the context of process 
algebras, the equivalence of two descriptions of the same system has been well investigated 
and various tools have been implemented for verifying the equivalences. Here we show 
that the equivalence relation deduced by M, coincides with a natural extension of 
the well-known bisimulation equivalence which has been proved of an experimental 
impact. 
2o Note that the transformation H does not change the number of alternating fixpoints. 
2’Availableathttp://www.cs.bris.ac.uk/”neil/ExternalLinks/comms94/cwb/cwb.htm 
22Availableathttp://www.csc.ncsu.edu/eos/users/r/rance/WWW/cwb-nc.html. 
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7. I. Relating model checking to logical implication 
In this subsection, we relate model checking to logical implication, following the line of 
reasoning in [25,27,52,53]. Given a finite transition system ‘7, it is not difficult to build a 
set of formulae 07 that encode 7. 
Let ‘7 = (S. [R, 1 a E zA]. n) be a transition system, the set of formulae DI is 
obtained by including, for each s E S. a formula of the form: 
The set of formulae DI encodes the transition system 7, in the sense given by the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 7.1. Given finite transition system 7 = (S, {I& / (;Y E 2A}, II), for every 
s E S urzd every M,, formulae @. we have: 
I.s+@ i# D~f=O,,+@. 
This proposition follows directly from the work on churucteristic formulae in [25,52, 
531, by applying the transformations F and H defined in the previous section. 
The above result shows that model checking can be seen as a special case of logical 
implication. The set of formulae DT can be seen as providing enough information to 
essentially single out a unique model, and thus logical implication is reduced to the 
verification of the truth-value of a formula in such a model, i.e., it is reduced to model 
checking. 
Note that, from the practical point of view, using a generic theorem prover for M, to 
do logical implication in DI instead of model checking in 7, although possible, is highly 
inefficient. Indeed DT has essentially the same size as 7, and logical implication for M, 
is EXPTIME-complete, according to the linearity of transformation H and the EXFTIME- 
completeness of standard mu-calculus [ 19,201. 
7.2. Equivalent descriptions 
A question that naturally arises is when two descriptions of a dynamic system can be 
considered equivalent. Observe that in this case we are asking about a property of the 
descriptions which is not necessarily related to properties of the modeled dynamic system. 
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Adopting an algebraic approach for such descriptions allows us to benefit from the 
study of equivalence classes on processes, to identify equivalent descriptions.23 Two 
main notions of equivalences have been proposed in the process algebra literature: trace 
equivalence [30], and bisimulation equivalence [45]. Trace equivalence identifies systems 
that have the same set of possible runs (traces). Bisimulation equivalence, on the other 
hand, identifies two systems if during every run whenever one system can perform a certain 
action, then the other system can perform the same action matching such a move. 
Here we focus on bisimulation equivalence, since we are interested in identifying two 
systems not only on the base of their “traces” (trace equivalence) but also on the base of 
their “branching behaviors”. 
We introduce a natural extension of the bisimulation equivalence studied in [45] to our 
representation formalism. We say state ~1 of the transition system 71 is equivalent to s2 
of 72, if the truth-value of each primitive proposition is the same in both ~1 and ~2, and 
whenever sl can evolve into si by a (synchronized) action CY, s:! can also do the action a! 
arriving at a state s; which is equivalent to si, and vice versa. Formally: 
Definition 7.2. Let 7 = (S, (%& 1 a E 2d}, l7) and 7’ = (S’, {R& I a! E 2d), n’) be two 
transition systems. 
(1) YI s S x S’ is a bisimulation if for all (r, r’) E ‘8, cx E A, 
(a) {A ) r E n(A)} = (A I I-’ E n’(A)]; 
(b) (r, t) E R, implies 3t’ : (r’, t’) E R& and (t, t’) E 8; and 
(c) (r’, t’) E ‘Rk implies 3 : (r, t) E Ra and (t, t’) E 8. 
(2) for s E s, s’ E S’, s and s’ are equivalent, written s Xl,, s’, if there exists a 
bisimulation !R such that (s, s’) E 8. 
The bisimulation equivalence xb can be expressed as a simple formula of first-order 
logic with fixpoints (first-order mu-calculus) [46,47]. As a consequence, the verification of 
bisimulation equivalence xb on finite transition systems can be performed in polynomial 
time with respect to the size of the systems (see, e.g., [l]). 
We also remark that some investigations have been done to check bisimulation equiva- 
lence directly on process descriptions. In particular, algorithms that run in polynomial time 
with respect to the size of process descriptions have been devised for some typical forms 
of processes [29]. 
An alternative way to define equivalence of descriptions is to make use of logic: two 
systems are considered as the same iff no logical formula can distinguish them (see [28]). 
Definition 7.3. Let 7 = (S, [FL 1 a E 2d}, l7) and 7’ = (S’, {R& I (Y E 2d}, n’) be two 
transition systems. For s E S, s’ E S’, s and s’ are equivalent with respect to M,, written 
S %MM, S’, iff 
{CD E M, ( 7, s + @} = {Q, E M, I I’, s’ b @}. 
In fact, the two forms of equivalence xb and x+ coincide under the very loose 
condition of imagejniteness. A configuration (p, a) is lmage$nite, if Vo E A. {(p’, a’) I 
23 Good comparisons of various notions of systems equivalences can be found in [16,60,61]. 
((p. CF), (p’, 0’)) E K&J is finite. A system is imagefinite if all its reachable configurations 
are image finite. 
Proposition7.4. Let 7 = (S, (R, / a 6 2A}, l7) and 7’ = (S’, {‘FL& ) a E 2A], l7’) be 
two imagejinite transition systems, and s E S, .s’ E S’. 
This proposition follows from the analogous theorem 24 (see, e.g., [55]) on bisimulation 
equivalence [4.5] and standard mu-calculus, by applying the transformations F and H 
defined in the previous section. 
We remark that Proposition 7.4 implies that M,, is well dimensioned for verifying 
properties of our descriptions, in the sense that, M, distinguishes two transition systems 
if and only if they are not equivalent according to the bisimulation equivalence zt,. Or, in 
other words, it implies that the bisimulation equivalence “b captures exactly the notion of 
distinguishability with respect to the logic M,, 
8. Conclusion 
The research presented in this paper can be regarded as a bridge between the area 
of Reasoning about Actions in Artificial Intelligence and the area of Concurrency in 
Computer Science. 
Specifically, we have presented a model checking based framework for reasoning about 
complex actions (processes) that are constituted by several concurrent activities performed 
by various interacting agents. 
We have shown that this framework, arisen originally in the area of Concurrency 
in Computer Science, is well-suited for reasoning about complex actions in Artificial 
Intelligence, in the simplified but significant case of having complete information on the 
state of the world. 
The strong connection with the area of Concurrency in Computer Science has allowed 
us to make use of the body of results devised in that area in the last decade, and to address 
issues like nonterminating executions, synchronizations, communications and interrupts, 
which have been hardly tacked so far in Artificial Intelligence. 
Besides the technical results, this work gives some conceptual tools for better 
understanding of the issues involved in integrating concurrent processes within Reasoning 
about Actions in Artificial Intelligence. In particular, we are referring to: 
- The separation of the specification of how atomic actions affect the state of the world 
from the specification of the process, as noticed in general for complex actions in [37]. 
- The possibility of specifying preconditions for actions (i.e., establishing when a given 
action can be executed) within the process in order to have them under the control of 
the process. This is the choice we have made in our proposal. 
- The need to maintain, together with the information about the current state of 
the world (the global store, in our case), the information about the current state 
*’ Such a theorem is NI turn an extension of the Hennessy-Milner Theorem [28 1 
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of the activities that are going on (the part of the process that remains to be 
executed). 
- Related to the above point, the use of a “single-step” transitions, i.e., transitions that 
return together with the new state of the world what remains to be executed of the 
process. In general, this allows for a simple and elegant treatment of both concurrency 
and nonterminating behaviors (see [ 14,151 for a use of “single-step” transitions within 
the situation calculus). 
Further technical extensions of the present work are possible along several directions. 
We outline some of them below. 
The first extension concerns the form of the update on the global store. In Section 2, 
we have introduced a very simple form of the update to compute the set a/{at , . . . , a,} 
of the possible global store resulting by performing the action {at, . . . , a,) on o (see 
Definitions 2.1 and 2.2). However, the only essential point to retain precisely the 
proposed setting is to have some function returning the set a/{at, . . . , a,} from the inputs 
bl,..., a,} and cr. It follows that we may adopt a more complex form of update, based, 
for example, on some notion of distance among global stores, and specify effects of actions 
as general formulae over Prop instead of literals. Moreover in this case, we can also 
address indirect effects by specifying domain constrains that must hold in each global 
store. Observe that the update we are interested in applies to interpretations, and thus is 
much simpler than update of theories discussed, e.g., in [31]. Research on d-family action 
languages, whose semantics is based on defining a transition function (which is essentially 
a successor-state function in our terms), e.g., [2,5,23,39], is relevant. 
Another possible extension concerns the form of the global store. In the present work, 
we describe the state of the world at a given point by a set of atomic propositions in the 
global store. That is, the global store can be thought of as a set of boolean variables, 
one for each atomic proposition. A possible extension is to consider the global store as 
a set of multi-valued variables, or even as a first-order interpretation over some fixed 
domain. Such an extension can be easily accommodated in our setting. Indeed, the 
way transition systems are built remains essentially the same, while the logic used for 
verification needs to be extended in order to take into account the new kind of properties 
expressed in the global store. Research in Databases on query languages based on first- 
order logic plus fixpoints (see, e.g., [l]) and that on complex transactions e.g., [4], are 
relevant. 
Finally, let us consider again the levels of abstractions introduced in Section 1. We 
believe that it is of great interest mixing representations at level 2 and at level 3, by mixing 
the process algebra approach presented here with the usual logical approach. This would 
allow us to introduce incomplete information in a better controlled way. For example, we 
could specify agents whose behavior is completely known by means of process description 
presented here, and agents whose behavior is only partially known (as happens typically 
for the environment) by logical axioms. To this end, the research on “loose specification” 
in process algebras [7,35], as well as research in knowledge representation on description 
logics that include assertions about “individuals” (which can be interpreted as a partial 
description of a transition system) [ 131, is relevant. 
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